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I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of the legal enforcement of morals, understood as the “question
of the legitimacy of ‘vice crimes’ or ‘victimless crimes,’”1 is a special
facet of the more general issue of the limits of the law.2 It is the subject
†  © 2017 Miguel Nogueira de Brito.  Lisbon University, Faculty of Law. 
* An earlier draft of this article was presented as a paper to the Conference on 
Legal Moralism held at the Institute for Law and Philosophy of the University of San 
Diego School of Law on May 21 and 22, 2016. I wish to thank useful comments made by
Larry Alexander, Saba Barzagan, Steven D. Smith and Maimon Schwarzchild.
1. LARRY ALEXANDER, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, in A COMPANION TO 
APPLIED ETHICS 128, 128 (R.G. Frey & C.H. Wellman eds., 2003). 
2. See generally John Stanton-Ife, The Limits of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb.
27, 2006), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/law-limits/ (acknowledging that 
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of the long-standing debate as to whether law—all law—can be used as a 
support for moral conceptions as such, or, more generally, whether there 
are limits on the use of law to enforce morality, as when it is claimed that 
the law must remain neutral as between different views of the good, be 
they religious or otherwise.3  Whether understood in this more general 
manner, or in the context of the legitimacy of vice crimes, the issue of 
legal enforcement of morality is one of the most significant problems in
legal theory and one of the most unrelenting challenges the law poses to 
liberal theory. 
The challenges that legal moralism pose for liberalism are clear if one
notes that, for a considerable sector of liberal thought, the question of the 
limits on legal enforcement of morality is no longer simply whether such 
enforcement is subject to certain limiting conditions, as was the case for 
centuries within the natural law tradition.4  For these liberals, the link 
between illegality and immorality is far less narrow.5  They are not quite
so concerned with finding out whether a specific course of action is immoral
in order for it to be punished or prohibited by law, but only whether it falls 
afoul of a punishment-limiting principle.6  According to this theory, an 
action is to be proscribed by law only if it causes harm to persons other 
than the agent and his consenting partners.7  This idea was formulated by 
John Stuart Mill, and is better known as the “harm principle.”8  It represents
the model liberal answer to the issue of legal moralism.  In this Article, I 
want to explore some of the ways in which liberalism has changed the issue 
of legal enforcement of morality, and some of the resulting implications. 
I shall begin by discussing the historical evolution of the theses regarding 
the “enforcement of morals” issue.  Then, I shall comment on the particular 
view whereby the issue of the legal enforcement of morality is considered
from the standpoint of the necessary preservation of society.  This, as is
well known, was the view defended by Lord Devlin in his debate with
Herbert Hart. While most people today tend to side with Hart on this debate,
the truth of the matter, as generally acknowledged, is that the challenge 
put up by Devlin has not yet been met.  Devlin claimed that “it is not
possible to set theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate
the law undoubtedly has limits, but questioning whether those limits are principled, and 
suggesting that finding principled limits is an “elusive task.”).
3. Id.
 4. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, Limited Government, in 3 HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMON 
GOOD: COLLECTED ESSAYS 93 (2011).
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against immorality” as a means toward the preservation of society.9  I want 
to explore this challenge and its implications for a liberal society.  More
precisely, I want to explore the possibility that the issue of how the 
preservation of society should be conceived is one of the most compelling 
problems for the future of liberal societies.  But, more importantly, I argue 
that Devlin’s view on legal moralism is not quite as opposed to the liberal
model as one might expect.  In fact, Devlin adopts the same detached
posture toward the issue of the legal enforcement of morals as do some
liberals; that is, keeping a distance from the intrinsic immorality of an act
when deciding to punish or otherwise prohibit that act.10 
II. THE “CLASSICAL THESIS” AND THE “MODERN CONTROVERSY” 
Hart once alluded to a “classical thesis” regarding the role of law in the 
enforcement of morality: this is the thesis defended by Plato and Aristotle 
whereby “the law of the city state exists not merely to secure that men
have the opportunity to lead a morally good life, but to see that they do”.11 
Fostering moral virtue is one of the goals of a society and one of the 
reasons it develops a legal system.12  This thesis is associated not only with a
virtue conception of morality, but also with a conception of morality “as 
a uniquely true or correct set of principles—not man-made, but either 
awaiting man’s discovery by the use of his reason or (in a theological
setting) awaiting its disclosure by revelation.”13 
A completely different way of envisioning the same issue is what Hart
called “the disintegration thesis,” a thesis that is characteristic of modern 
controversy and according to which “society is not the instrument of the 
moral life; rather morality is valued as the cement of society[.]”14 This
thesis is associated with a relativist conception of morality and the 
morality to which it refers does not necessarily have a rational content, 
9. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 12 (Liberty Fund 2009) (1970). 
10. In fact, as argued by Bernard E. Harcourt and others, one can even affirm that 
Devlin’s argument also relies on harm.  See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm
Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 125 & n.51 (1999).  I further discuss this issue
below. 
11. H.L.A. HART, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, reprinted in 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 248, 248 (Clarendon Press 1983) (1967). 
12. Id.
 13. Id.
 14. Id. 
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but merely a conventional or positive one.15  As Hart sees it, the case for 
the enforcement of morality on this view, which is the view he attributes
to Patrick Devlin, “is that its maintenance is necessary to prevent the 
disintegration of society.”16 
Lord Devlin also acknowledges a distinction between two grounds to
which the state may lay claim in order to legislate in matters of morals.
One of these grounds is the Platonic ideal whereby “the State exists to 
promote virtue among its citizens.”17 For Devlin, “[t]his is not acceptable to
Anglo-American thought.  It invests the State with power of determination 
between good and evil, destroys freedom of conscience and is the paved
road to tyranny.  It is against this concept of the State’s power that Mill’s 
words are chiefly directed.”18  The alternative ground is simply that “society 
may legislate to preserve itself.”19 
Lord Devlin considered that “the essential difference between the two 
theories is that under the first the law-maker must determine for himself
what is good for his subjects.”20  Conversely,
under the second theory the law-maker is not required to make any judgment about 
what is good and what is bad.  The morals which he enforces are those ideas about 
right and wrong which are already accepted by the society for which he is legislating 
and which are necessary to preserve its integrity.21 
The mandate of the law-maker, according to this second theory, “is to 
preserve the essentials of his society, not to reconstruct them according to 
his own ideas.”22 What he must ascertain is “not the true belief but the
common belief.”23 
Hart acknowledged that, in “older controversies,” advocates of milder 
positions—according to whom “the state could punish only activities causing
secular harm”—challenged the classical thesis.24  The political philosophy 
tradition includes not only the Platonist-Aristotelian stream, which authorizes 
punishing immoral acts as such, but also the Thomist tradition, which
authorizes punishment only when the immoral act has a public character
and jeopardizes public order, public morality, or the rights of others.25
 15. Id.
 16. Id. at 248–49. 
17. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 89. 
18. Id. 
19. Id.
 20. Id. 
21. Id. at 89–90. 
22. Id. at 90. 
23. Id. at 94. 
24. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 23 (1963).
25. For Saint Thomas Aquinas, human laws should not “forbid all vices, from
which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for 
468
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This, as John Finnis stresses, is expressed in Section 19 of the Argentinean 
Constitution of 1853: “[t]he private actions of men which in no way offend
public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are only reserved to God 
and are exempted from the authority of judges.”26 
Just as the radical legal moralist encountered opposition in the classical
tradition of natural law from milder positions such as those of Aquinas, 
so too is there discord within utilitarianism between defenders and critics 
of legal moralism.  This was the backdrop for the debate between John Stuart
Mill and James Fitzjames Stephen in the nineteenth century,27 apparently
revisited in the twentieth century in the debate between Hart and Devlin.28 
The soft version of legal moralism defended by Aquinas looks somewhat 
similar to Mill’s harm principle.  In the words of John Stuart Mill, this is a
very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with
the individual in the way of compulsion and control . . . . [t]hat the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to 
the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the
prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits 
murder, theft, and such like.”  THOMAS AQUINAS, 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 96, reprinted
in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 232 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 
Fathers of the English Domincan Province trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) 
(1941).
26. JOHN FINNIS, Hart as a Political Philosopher, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 268, 270 (2011).  Finnis says that Hart ignores the Thomist position. Id. at 270
n.52.  This is only true if one considers just Hart’s essay Social Solidarity and the Enforcement 
of Morality, which was mentioned above, but not if one also takes into account his 1962 
Harry Camp Lectures at Stanford University, published under the title Law, Liberty and 
Morality. In this last work, Hart certainly had the Thomist tradition in mind, even if he
did not mention it explicitly, when he stated: “No doubt in older controversies the opposed 
positions were different: the question may have been whether the state could punish only
activities causing secular harm or also acts of disobedience to what were believed to be
divine commands or prescriptions of natural law.”  HART, supra note 24, at 23. 
27. It can be argued that by interfering in people’s lives the state succeeds in keeping
them safe and happy. See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND
THREE BRIEF ESSAYS 72 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1991) (1873); see also JOHN GRAY, MILL 
ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE 134–47 (2d ed. 1996). 
28. Hart did not fail to notice the similarity in the general tone and sometimes in the
arguments of the two debates.  See HART, supra note 24, at 16.  Devlin also acknowledged 
this similarity. See DEVLIN, supra note 9, at vii.  I say “apparently” because, as we shall see, 
even if the debate between John Stuart Mill and James Fitzjames Stephen is similar to the 
natural law debate between the Platonic-Aristotelian stream and the Thomist stream, the
dispute between Hart and Devlin is not simply a reenactment of the first debate. 
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do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.29 
Both Aquinas and Mill adopt a restraining attitude toward punishment.
The similarity between their views, however, is minimal.  For Aquinas, there
is a clear distinction between the immorality of an act and the limiting
conditions that may rule out its legal punishment, as is the case when an
act hurts nobody.30  If such conditions apply, however, the immorality of
the act itself is not affected.31 Immorality is not displaced by the conditions
limiting its legal punishment or prohibition.32  For Mill, on the contrary, a
limiting condition of legal punishment or prohibition, such as harm to others, 
is elevated to the only legitimate principle of punishment.33  Immorality 
is displaced by harm.34 After Mill, it is not so much the case that “[h]arm,
not morality, structures the debate,”35 but that the moral relevance of an act 
is reduced to the harm it may cause to others. 
Mill’s principle looks irresistibly simple: “[i]f an activity is not harmful, 
government must leave it alone.  Conversely, if the activity causes harm, 
government may regulate it.”36 The simplicity of the harm principle, however, 
comes at a price: its emptiness.37  What constitutes a harm is essentially
an open question.  If we adopt a subjective conception of harm, such as pain 
or individual preferences, it will be difficult for any two people to reach an
agreement as to whether a certain act is to be considered harmful.  Furthermore, 
a merely subjective conception of harm will probably lead to results that 
29. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in  ON LIBERTY WITH THE 
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1989). 
30. See AQUINAS, 25 note 25. 
31. Id.
 32. Id.
 33. See HART, supra note 24, at 4.
 34. See  ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MAN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY 72–73 (1993). 
35. Harcourt, supra note 10, at 112.  For Harcourt this is a development of the debate
on legal moralism.  As he sees it,
[t]he harm principle is effectively collapsing under the weight of its own success. 
Claims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become 
meaningless: the harm principle no longer serves the function of a critical principle 
because non-trivial harm arguments permeate the debate.  Today, the issue is no
longer whether a moral offense causes harm, but rather what type and what amount
of harms the challenged conduct causes, and how the harms compare.  On those 
issues, the harm principle is silent.  This is a radical departure from the liberal
theoretic, progressive discourse of the 1960s. 
Id. at 113.  In my opinion, Harcourt’s account describes a necessary development of the 
harm principle. 
36. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 74 (2010). 
37. Smith speaks of the harm principle as a hollow vessel, to be filled at each one’s
convenience. Id. at 72. 
470
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are inconsistent with liberty.  Within a subjective conception of harm, in
fact, it will always be possible that my conduct will cause harm to others, 
giving the community a right to restrict my freedom.  Mill was undeterred
by such obstacles.  He regarded the value of liberty, of which the harm
principle is a specification, as essentially compatible with his notion of
utility.38  For him, utility is “the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions;
but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests
of man as a progressive being.”39  Those interests, he contends, “authori[z]e
the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect 
to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people.  If any 
one does an act that is hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for 
punishing him.”40 As this quote demonstrates, the concept of harm— 
according to Mill—is rather elusive: a harmful act is an act that hurts other
people; that is, an act that affects the interest of other people, which is to
be construed on the basis of utility as grounded on the “permanent interests
of man as a progressive being.”41  These considerations are enough to confirm
the extreme malleability, to say the least, of the harm principle. On the
other hand, it seems as if Mill is replacing the harm principle with a more
complex liberty principle “constructed in order to promote the ideal of individual 
self-development in its richest diversity.”42 
Regardless of this ambiguity, or perhaps precisely because of it, Mill’s
attack on legal moralism has proven extremely influential in criminal and
political theories. After Mill, two possible strategies remain to the legal
moralist: to reinstate some version of the natural law midstream, or to
adopt harm arguments within a moralist framework.  The first strategy is 
the one adopted, most notably, by Michael Moore with his theory of legal 
moralism; that is, “the theory that all and only moral wrongs should be
prohibited by the criminal law.”43  Moore’s account of legal moralism is
closely related to his account of retributivism, according to which criminal 




 42. Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux: On Same-Sex 
Marriage, the Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John Stuart Mill’s
Essay On Liberty (1859), and H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Harm Principle 13 (Univ. of Chicago
Law Sch., Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 437, 2013). 
43. MICHAEL S. MOORE, Liberty’s Constraints on What Should be Made Criminal,
in  CRIMINALIZATION: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 182, 191 (R.A. 
Duff et al. eds., 2014). 
 471
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law should “punish all and only those who are morally culpable in the
doing of some morally wrongful action.”44  Morality, however, is viewed 
from a critical standpoint and is unconcerned with sexual practices such
as obscenity, homosexuality, prostitution, and the like.  Furthermore, Moore
appears to recognize several grounds on which the reach of the criminal 
sanction may be limited, even when immorality is involved, such as legality, 
convenience, epistemic modesty, and the protection of basic liberties.45 
What concerns me here, however, is the second strategy, the strategy of
Lord Devlin.  The point I want to stress in all of the above concerns the
novelty that liberalism introduces into “modern controversy” with respect
to the legal enforcement of morality.  What is at stake is no longer the intrinsic 
immorality of an act but the harm such an act may cause to others.  This 
is clearly true in respect of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. Yet, it also
holds true for Lord Devlin’s “disintegration thesis,” as already demonstrated
by Bernard Harcourt.  One way to describe this thesis is to say that an act
should be punished, or otherwise prohibited, if it causes harm to society 
in general; that is, if it endangers the maintenance of society.  In the words 
of Bernard Harcourt: 
Devlin appeared to be arguing that morality should be enforced in order to protect 
society from the danger of disintegration—an argument that relied on harm.  On
this view, the only difference between Hart and Devlin was that Hart focused on
harm to the individual, whereas Devlin focused on harm to society as a whole.46 
In this sense it is certainly true that the debate between Lord Devlin and 
Herbert Hart “has been carried on in a completely utilitarian framework.”47 
Some clarification is needed at this point. As noted by Hart, Devlin 
sometimes adopts a moderate thesis, according to which a common morality
is “the cement of society.”48  This is the thesis I am primarily exploring in 
this article and the one Devlin seems to endorse a majority of the time.
But, at other times, Devlin seems to subscribe to an extreme thesis, far
closer to James Fitzjames Stephen’s views, whereby the “enforcement of 
morality is regarded as a thing of value, even if immoral acts harm no one
directly, or indirectly by weakening the moral cement of society.”49  In 
the apt words of Bernard Harcourt, 
44. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 35 (1997).
45. See  DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 197 (2008).
46. Harcourt, supra note 10, at 125 (citation omitted).
47. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Another Look at Legal Moralism, 77 ETHICS 50, 50 (1966). 
In this sense, it is possible to construe Devlin’s position as consequentialist, “because he
believes that the preservation of morality through the criminal sanction is essential to
protect society.”  HUSAK, supra note 45, at 196 n.79. 
48. HART, supra note 24, at 49. 
49. Id.
472
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[u]nder the second interpretation, referred to as the extreme thesis, Devlin argued 
that morality should be enforced for the sake of morality tout court: morality for
morality’s sake.  If Devlin’s claim (that private acts of immorality present a danger to
society) was not intended to be an empirical claim, Hart suggested, then Devlin
equated morality with society.50 
Devlin appears to embrace this thesis more decidedly when he openly airs 
his most personal views, those relating to the relationship between morality
and religion:
No society has yet solved the problem of how to teach morality without religion.
So the law must base itself on Christian morals and to the limit of its ability
enforce them, not simply because they are the morals of most of us, nor simply
because they are the morals which are taught by the established Church—on these
points the law recognizes the right to dissent—but for the compelling reason that 
without the help of Christian teaching the law will fail.51 
Lord Devlin’s stance on the legal enforcement of morals—more precisely, 
his stance as articulated in the moderate thesis mentioned above—is heavily 
influenced by the liberal terms of “modern controversy.”52  However, the
fact that he relied on harm to society as a whole, and not on harm to the 
individual, fundamentally affects his position.  In this context, the main 
points of Lord Devlin’s position are: (i) legal moralism refers to positive,
or conventional, morality, not critical morality53; (ii) its main purpose is 
the preservation of society by means of its public or common morality;
(iii) “it is not possible to set theoretical limits to the power of the State to
legislate against immorality.  It is not possible to settle in advance exceptions 
to the general rule or to define inflexibly areas of morality into which the 
law is in no circumstances to be allowed to enter.”54 
I believe this third point to be true and the first one to be false. In other 
words, there is no justification whatsoever for the law to uphold the positive
morality, as such, of a given society, even if there are prudential reasons,
or justice and rights-based reasons for not upholding critical morality in a
particular case.55  Nonetheless, once we accept that the morality in question
 50. Harcourt, supra note 35, at 128. 
51. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 25. 
52. See HART, supra note 24, at 23. 
53. In Devlin’s own words, “[w]hat is important is not the quality of the creed but 
the strength of the belief in it.  The enemy of society is not error but indifference.” DEVLIN, 
supra note 9, at 114. 
54. Id. at 12–13. 
55. See  GEORGE, supra note 34, at 44 (“Nevertheless, the existence of justice-or
rights-based grounds, as well as prudential reasons, for ‘not representing every vice’, does 
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is critical morality, there are no criteria for principles that would allow us
to rule out in advance the legal enforcement of morality as such.56  In this
sense, Lord Devlin was right.57 
What really interests me, however, is exploring the following questions, 
which are more focused on Devlin’s second point: (i) Does the preservation 
of a society rest on maintaining a common morality? And, if so, what is 
to be understood in our modern pluralist societies by a common morality?;
and (ii) Does Devlin’s oscillation between a moderate and an extreme 
thesis, the first focused on public harm and the second on legal moralism, 
rest on a mere unsophisticated philosophical construction or is it revelatory
of something more profound?
III. THE PRESERVATION OF SOCIETY IN UNIFORM SOCIETIES
Lord Devlin is of the opinion that “[s]ociety is entitled by means of its 
laws to protect itself from dangers, whether from within or without.”58 
But what exactly does this mean?
The first comment in this regard is that while it was Devlin who defended 
a conventional morality as the cement of society, Hart, his opponent in the 
legal moralism debate, advanced the theoretical elaboration of his moderate 
position. Hart called this position the “disintegration thesis,” and even 
went so far as to identify its precursors in sociological literature, who he
saw as being Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons.59 
Devlin, in fact, does not elaborate much on his views.  He draws on a 
“political parallel” for their presentation: just as society cannot tolerate 
rebellion or treason because an established government is necessary for 
the existence of society, so too should moral vices be legally persecuted
not entail that there are never valid reasons to legally prohibit any vice on the ground of
its immorality.”).
56. See Danny Scoccia, In Defense of “Pure” Legal Moralism, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
513, 514 (2013) (“But Hart’s demolition of Devlin’s argument left unscathed the case for
a ‘legal moralism’ that ignores positive morality and appeals directly to critical morality.”). 
57. See Gerald Dworkin, Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927 (1999).  Regarding the criminal law in particular, I agree 
with Anthony Duff that “[w]e should not assume (as too many theorists tend to assume)
that we can create a rational and properly limited system of criminal law only if we can
articulate a single master principle, or set of principles, that provides substantive general 
criteria by which we can identify the kinds of conduct that are in principle criminalizable . . . .”
R.A. Duff, Towards a Modest Legal Moralism, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 217, 232–33 (2014). 
58. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 13. 
59. HART, supra note 24, at 252 (“The determination of the precise status and the 
role of these propositions in Parson’s complex works would be a task of some magnitude, 
so I shall select from the literature of sociology Durkheim’s elaboration of a form of the
disintegration theory, because his variant of the theory . . . is also specifically connected
with the topic of the enforcement of morality by the criminal law.”).
474
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because an established morality is necessary for the maintenance of society.60 
For Devlin, “the suppression of vice is as much the law’s business as the 
suppression of subversive activities; it is no more possible to define a 
sphere of private morality than it is to define one of private subversive
activity.”61  Hart, in his first published critique of Devlin’s views, denounced 
this analogy between moral vice and treason as absurd; that is, we can
make immorality seem like treason “only if we assume that deviation from 
a general moral code is bound to affect that code, and to lead not merely
to its modification but to its destruction.”62  On the contrary, for Hart “we 
have ample evidence for believing that people will not abandon morality,
will not think any better of murder, cruelty, and dishonesty, merely because 
some private sexual practice which they abominate is not punished by the
law.”63 
Against these contentions, the alternative that Hart has to offer Devlin
is to supplement his thesis with empirical evidence or to accept that “his 
statements about the necessity of a common morality for the existence of
society were not empirical statements at all but were disguised tautologies 
or necessary truths depending entirely on the meaning given to the 
expression ‘society,’ ‘existence,’ or ‘continued existence’ of society.”64 
Given the lack of evidence presented by Lord Devlin, one is forced to 
subscribe to the second alternative, according to which his statements 
about the necessity of a public morality for the continued existence of society
were not empirical statements at all.  Hart considers several hypotheses in
this regard. 
First of all, the disintegration thesis could be perceived as a disguised
conservative thesis, which simply claims that the majority in a society have a
right to defend their existing moral environment against change.65 
Second, the disintegration thesis could refer to the possibility that “the 
common morality which is essential to society, and which is to be preserved 
by legal enforcement, is that part of its social morality which contains only 
those restraints and prohibitions that are essential to the existence of any
 60. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 13. 
61. Id. at 13–14. 
62.  H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, LISTENER, July 30, 1959, at 162, 163. 
63. Id.
 64. HART, supra note 24, at 250.  Devlin’s inability to provide evidence of his claims
about public morality was also pointed out by Ronald Dworkin.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 246 (1978).
65. See HART, supra note 24, at 251. 
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society of human beings whatever.”66 This is the thesis defended by Aquinas,
as mentioned above, and many other philosophers since.67  The problem
with this thesis, of course, is that all defenders of the harm principle would 
accept it.  In fact there is very likely an overlap between the restrictions 
essential to the existence of any society and the restrictions envisaged by 
the harm principle. 
Third, the disintegration thesis might refer not to that part of morality 
that is essential to the maintenance of any society whatever but only to the 
preservation of what is essential to a particular society, or “a central core
of rules or principles which constitutes its pervasive and distinctive style of
life.”68  This is what Lord Devlin has in mind when he speaks of monogamy
as a moral principle.69  Yet, even if we could produce empirical evidence of
the importance of this central core for the maintenance of a given society,
this would not, according to Hart, be equivalent to an empirical claim 
regarding the connection between maintaining a common morality and 
preventing the disintegration of a society.70  It would only mean the
disappearance of the central core of a certain society at a certain historical
moment, not its complete disintegration.71 
In any event, Hart discusses the types of evidence that might conceivably
be relevant regarding the alternatives to maintaining a common morality. 
One of these alternatives “is general uniform permissiveness in the area 
of conduct previously covered by the common morality.”72  In this alternative, 
the thesis to be tested would presumably be that “without the discipline 
involved in the submission of one area of life, e.g.[,] the sexual, to the 
requirements of a common morality, there would necessarily be a weakening 
of the general capacity of individuals for self-control.”73  This would
effectively contribute to the disintegration of society.74 To this argument,
Hart objects that permissiveness in certain areas of conduct might not
have the effect of contaminating moral life in its entirety; on the contrary, 
it just “might make it easier for men to submit to restraints on violence 
which are essential for social life.”75 
This interpretation of Lord Devlin’s views on the disintegration of society
has been disputed.  Robert George asserted that, for Devlin, permissiveness 
66. Id. at 258. 
67. See AQUINAS, supra note 25. 
68. HART, supra note 24, at 258. 
69. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 76. 
70. HART, supra note 24, at 259. 
71. Id.
 72. Id. at 261. 
73. Id.
 74. Id. at 261–62. 
75. Id. at 262. 
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of acts condemned as grossly immoral in a society under its prevailing 
morality would not necessarily lead to chaos.76  As George notes, “[p]eople
might continue to live in proximity to one another in a state of peace and
order. They would, however, cease being a society; for ‘society,’ Devlin
supposed, is something more than people living in proximity to one another
in a state of peace.”77 According to this view, the price to be paid for failing 
to maintain a shared morality is social disintegration, not in the sense of
individuals being deprived of safety for their person and property, but in
the sense of losing the good of interpersonal integration. The problem with
this view is that even if we agree with the intrinsic value of the community 
for the lives of individuals, this does not justify criminalizing acts that
are contrary to the dominant morality of a given society, including purely 
private immoral acts.
George was certainly correct when he claimed, “Hart’s criticisms of 
Devlin’s disintegration thesis lose their force if we do not take Devlin to 
have supposed that social order will break down whenever social cohesion 
is lost.”78  In other words, “Devlin . . . need neither claim nor suppose that
the price of failing to maintain a shared morality is an inevitable descent
into Hobbes’ state of nature.”79  The disintegration thesis need not only mean 
either (i) the breakdown of order; or (ii) the destruction of a society that 
is defined as identical with its morality at any given time in its history.  In 
the disintegration of society, “society” could mean “a state of affairs in which 
individuals identify their own interests with those of others to whom they
understand and experience themselves as integrally related by virtue of 
common commitments and beliefs.”80  This kind of communal good could
effectively be destroyed by a spreading general permissiveness of immoral
acts even if these acts would cause no harm to others.  However, for Robert 
George, unlike Patrick Devlin, the morality that condemns such acts must
be true, and only if it is true can the law enforce it.81  Yet, if this is the case, 
one question remains to be answered: does the immoral act fall foul of the 
law because it is intrinsically immoral or, because, in addition or alternatively,
 76. See GEORGE, supra note 34, at 68 (1993) (“Devlin did not assert that a society’s 
toleration of acts condemned as grossly immoral under its prevailing morality would
necessarily lead to chaos . . . .”).
77. Id.
 78. Id. at 69. 
79. Id.
 80. Id. at 70. 
81. Id. at 71. 
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it endangers the good of communal life?  This question does not arise in 
Devlin’s scheme because for him the immorality as such of an act is only 
relevant if it endangers society.  But for George it appears there are two
moral wrongs: (i) the moral wrongness of the act in itself; and (ii) the moral
wrongness such an act causes as a consequence of destroying a communal
good. This second moral wrong, however, seems to be dependent on an
empirical question; that is, ascertaining—as a matter of fact—whether the
doing of an immoral act in itself endangers or destroys the good of communal 
life. If this is so, then Hart’s criticisms of Devlin remain unanswered. 
The second alternative considered by Hart is “moral pluralism[,] involving 
divergent sub-moralities in relation to the same area of conduct.”82  In this
case, the thesis to be tested “would presumably be that where moral pluralism 
develops . . . quarrels over the differences generated by divergent moralities
must eventually destroy the minimal forms of restraint necessary for social 
cohesion.”83  The counter-thesis would of course be tolerance, or the fact
of “divergent moralities living in peace” in the same society.84 
What is striking in this account is, in the first place, the consideration 
of moral pluralism exclusively from the standpoint of providing evidence 
in support of or against the disintegration thesis.  The other possibility is
to consider moral pluralism as a new model of common morality, but one
that dispenses with the very idea of preservation of a society resting on
the convergent positive moralities of all its members in relation to the same 
areas of conduct. I will explore this possibility, and its relationship with 
political liberalism, in the next section. 
A second reason for confusion regarding Hart’s account is the obvious 
absence of a third alternative, in addition to permissiveness and moral
pluralism.  This would be the spread of paternalism into the area of conduct
previously covered by common morality.  It is true that this alternative
would not have made much sense to Lord Devlin since he doubted the very
possibility of drawing a theoretical distinction between moral paternalism and 
the enforcement of morality.85  He even restated “the famous sentence” in
Mill so as to accommodate paternalism and the result, as he puts it, is clearly 
“unattractive.”86  As a consequence of this restatement, Mill’s sentence would 
have to read as follows: 
the only purposes for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community against his will are to prevent harm to others or for his 
own physical or moral good. His own good either physical or moral is therefore
 82. HART, supra note 24, at 261. 
83. Id. at 262. 
84. Id.
 85. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 136. 
86. See id. at 134. 
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a sufficient warrant.  He can rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so or because it will make him happier, but not because, 
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right.87 
In other words, adding paternalism to the harm principle necessarily produces 
some kind of legal moralism.
Hart, on the contrary, believed it is possible to differentiate between
paternalism, which he somewhat inadequately defines as “the protect[ion]
[of] people against themselves,”88 and legal moralism.  As he saw it, even 
if Mill rejected both, this does not mean that he was unaware of the
differences between them.89 
I believe Hart was unable to make a convincing distinction between
paternalism and legal moralism.  However, that is of no concern to us in
the present context. In any event, if Hart believed that paternalism differs 
from legal moralism, he would have to admit the hypothesis that a
combination of physical and moral paternalism with moral individualism 
would be sufficient to prevent the disintegration of society.  In this case,
the spread of paternalism would probably lead to the dismantling of a 
common morality without necessarily having as a consequence the 
disintegration of society.90 
IV. THE PRESERVATION OF SOCIETY AND THE FACT OF PLURALISM
There is little doubt that modern societies are no longer built, if indeed 
they ever were, on a single positive morality shared by all their members.
Instead of this common morality, we tend to adopt the view whereby modern 
societies are characterized, in the words of Hart, by the coexistence of divergent
sub-moralities in relation to the same areas of conduct.  Would this necessarily 
entail the end of a common morality and the disappearance, for want of subject
matter, of the disintegration thesis? 
Lord Devlin’s thesis that the preservation of society rests on the 
maintenance of a positive common morality is allegedly built exclusively
 87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. HART, supra note 24, at 31. 
89. Id. 
90. There are contrary readings of this possible development.  Compare GERTRUDE
HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY: FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN
VALUES 263 (1994) (voicing  displeasure with what she views as a new species of “moral 
correctness”), with  CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN
PATERNALISM 123 (2014) (arguing that soft paternalism offers new opportunities for liberty). 
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on empirical foundations.91  What about Hart’s suggestion that a modern
alternative to a common morality would be moral pluralism?  He admits
that moral pluralism could lead to disputes generated by divergent moralities 
that could eventually destroy the minimal forms of restraint necessary for
social cohesion.92  However, as an alternative, he also admits tolerance, or 
the fact of “divergent moralities living in peace” in the same society.93 
The interesting point of this moral pluralism is that it is conceived as an
alternative to the disintegration of society.  The preservation of society no 
longer depends on the maintenance of a positive common morality but upon 
a kind of second-order morality; that is, the development of habits of tolerance 
that render possible the coexistence of divergent first-order moralities.
There must be limits to this tolerance, even if it is conceived within the
context of a mere modus vivendi,94 beyond which the goal of assuring the
preservation of society as-built on the coexistence of different moralities 
can no longer be attained. 
What precisely is the nature of the concepts, which I use here for mere 
ease of expression, of first-and-second-order moralities?  It would be
tempting to say that first-order moralities are Rawls’ comprehensive and 
general doctrines and that second-order moralities are his political principles
and values.95 Yet, first order-moralities are still viewed in the discussion 
above on moral pluralism as positive moralities existing in modern
societies.96 They may, or may not, be comprehensive doctrines.  This coheres
with the fact that most people do not actually possess fully-comprehensive
moral, religious and philosophical doctrines.97  On the other hand, the
habits of tolerance which allow the coexistence of divergent positive first-
order moralities are apparently generated within such moralities and do not 
refer to something imposed from the outside. 
91. See DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 94. 
92. HART, supra note 24, at 262. 
93. Id.
94. For the concept of modus vivendi, see CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL
COMPLEXITY 74–75 (1987) (explaining that the “modus vivendi view is the one most
readily suggested by the argument for political neutrality”) (emphasis added), and JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED EDITION 147 (1996) (noting that a typical use 
of modus vivendi “is to characterize a treaty between two states whose national aims and 
interests put them at odds.”). 
95. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 11–15 (1993). 
96. Hart opposed Devlin’s view of social morality as a “seamless web,” which he
found unconvincing, but he did not oppose the view of morality as composed of beliefs 
rather than of critical principles. See HART, supra note 24, at 51; DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 
115. 
97. GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM: PUBLIC REASON 
AS A POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 181 (2003). 
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Nonetheless, the idea of a second-order morality as implicit in first-
order moralities may perhaps assist in clearing up an inherent ambiguity
in Rawls’ account of the relationship between comprehensive doctrines 
and political principles.  One of the features of these principles is that
“they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of
any kind.”98  But how can a political principle be justified if not within a
comprehensive doctrine? A possible answer to this question might lie in 
yet another feature of Rawls’s account of political principles and values, 
which is that “they can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as 
implicit in the public political culture of a constitutional regime, such as 
the conception of citizens as free and equal persons, and of society as
a fair system of cooperation.”99  But this is circular: a political principle is
political if it belongs to the public political culture of a constitutional
regime.  In other words, Rawls presumes the answer in the very act of asking 
what political principles are.  This is precisely where the idea of second-
order morality as implicit in first-order positive moralities of a society can
be of assistance.  It helps us to understand that the idea of the political as 
freestanding makes no sense,100 and that political principles and values cannot 
be shielded from the problems of moral pluralism.101 
What are the implications of this for the disintegration thesis?  Second-
order morality consists essentially of developing habits of toleration and
reasonableness in all the members of a community.  These are constituent 
habits of a certain type of community and have an evident normative content.
Hence, Hart’s basic objection to the disintegration thesis—that the shift in
positive morality does not necessarily mean the destruction of the corresponding
society, merely its modification—no longer applies.  A pluralist society 
must be able to defend by way of law, if necessary, its habits of toleration 
and reasonableness, and this entails protecting all the different positive 
moralities that generate such habits as well as protecting itself, at least, from
all those other positive moralities that reject them.
I would now like to draw some implications from the relevance of the 
disintegration thesis to modern pluralist societies.  The first point concerns
how to understand state neutrality toward conceptions of the good, especially 
98. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED” 
143 (1999).
99. Id.
100. On political principles and values as freestanding, see RAWLS, supra note 94, at 
374–401. 
101. GAUS, supra note 97, at 190. 
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religious ones.102  Liberals usually acknowledge that the state should maintain
necessary neutrality toward conceptions of the good and convictions of 
conscience.103  Yet it is doubtful whether such neutrality on the part of the
state will impose an equal burden on all citizens.  A neutral attitude may
in fact take different forms: the state can abstain from interference in the
citizens’ system of beliefs and values, but it can also adopt a more active 
stance in defending citizens’ freedom and equality in the pursuit of their 
own aims. 
Neutrality is at risk of being incomplete if it is to be perceived as a non-
supportive attitude of the state toward its citizens’ system of beliefs and
values.104 Certainly, the liberal neutral state defends the principle that
individuals are to be considered autonomous moral agents, free to choose 
and define their own conception of the good life, and it is precisely this 
view that will be favored in public schools.  Consequently, “[i]n exposing
students to a plurality of worldviews and modes of life, the democratic and 
liberal state makes the task more difficult for parents seeking to transmit
a particular order of beliefs to their children.”105 
Conversely, if state neutrality is perceived as an attitude that is more
supportive of or promotes its citizens’ religious worldviews, the state should 
accept the public coexistence of religions and their participation in civic
discourse.  Examples of this supportive attitude are allowing religion 
to be taught in public schools, provided that all religious faiths are afforded
similar conditions, the presence of chaplains in caregiving facilities or prisons,
or tax benefits for religious associations.  Without doubt, even in this version 
of neutrality, the state must be strictly separate from religion.  This does
not mean, however, that religious worldviews are only relevant in the private
sphere of individuals.  As stressed by Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure,
102. According to Devlin, positive morality almost always presupposes a religious 
base: “Most men take their morality as a whole and in fact derive it, though this is
irrelevant, from some religious doctrine.”  DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 115. At some points
he is more assertive about this religious base of positive morality, as when he says that, 
after the admission of freedom of conscience, the judges “continued to administer the law
on the footing that England was a Christian country.  Reluctantly they recognized respectful 
criticism of Christian doctrine as permissible and the crime of blasphemy virtually disappeared.
But Christian morals remained embedded in the law.” Id. at 87 (citation omitted). 
103. See, e.g., STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS
25–33 (2d ed. 1996). 
104. See  JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE 16 (Jane Marie Todd trans., 2011) (“[I]t is clear that such neutrality on the state’s 
part will not impose an equal burden on all citizens.”).
105. Id.
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the public-private distinction turns out to be too general and indeterminate in
many cases to allow us to assess the appropriate place of religion in the public 
space.  There is also a vast space, often called ‘civil society,’ lying between the state
and private life, where a host of social movements and organizations, including
some motivated by spiritual or religious convictions, will engage in debate on questions
of public interest and will become involved in charitable or humanitarian causes.106 
A strong civil society, not positive morality, is the cement of modern pluralist
societies.
How is the state to choose between the non-supportive and promotional 
attitudes to which I have referred?  The answer lies in developing habits 
of tolerance, as well as the virtue of civility,107 within the religious and 
philosophical worldviews that coexist in a given society and their acceptance 
of participation in civic discourse within civil society. 
A second point concerns the concept of disintegration of society. Hart, 
as already mentioned above, considered that even if some part of conventional 
morality became more permissive, “the society in question would not have 
been destroyed or ‘subverted.’”108  Such a development could not be compared,
along the lines of Devlin’s parallel between moral vices and seditious acts, 
“to the violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitutional
change in its form, consistent not only with the preservation of a society 
but with its advance.”109 
This may be valid when what is at issue is the positive morality of a 
given society, but it is very unlikely to be the case when we are faced with 
the values of moral pluralism. This is at the core of the public harm
interpretation of Devlin’s thesis. In this domain, a parallel between
immoral acts—in the sense of acts contrary to the values of pluralism— 
and seditious acts, is certainly more plausible.  Overthrowing habits of
tolerance and civic discourse carries the risk of destruction of a given society
 106. Id. at 40. 
107. See EDWARD SHILS, THE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM,
TRADITION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 340–41 (Steven Grosby ed., 1997) (noting that “civility is 
a mode of political action” whereby “antagonists are also members of the same society,” 
and that “civility is [also] a mode of conduct which protects liberal democratic society
from the danger of extreme partisanship[.]”).  Rawls speaks of the duty of civility; that is, 
the duty “to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values
of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in
deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made”. RAWLS, supra
note 94, at 217 (citation omitted). 
108. HART, supra note 24, at 52. 
109. Id.
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as a liberal society, and this is equivalent to a seditious act against a liberal
constitutional regime.  In this spirit, Article 46(4) of the Portuguese 
Constitution prohibits armed associations, military, militarized or paramilitary
type associations, and organizations that are racist or display a fascist
ideology,110 while Article 21(2) of the German Basic Law provides that
parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their members,
seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger 
the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, are unconstitutional.111 
Disintegration of society in this sense is not to be equated with the
breaking of social order—as Hart interpreted Devlin—or even to the loss 
of the sense of community as an intrinsic value for the well-being of all 
its members—according to Robert George’s alternative interpretation.112 
In this sense, the disintegration of society is a possible outgrowth of all
modern societies and not simply some form of antithesis to liberalism
which combines atomism and collectivism.113  In modern pluralist societies,
the disintegration of society involves totalitarianism and fundamentalism,
both understood as the “nightmare” of liberalism.114 
V. THE SMUGGLING GAME
I will now turn, albeit briefly, to the second question raised at the end 
of Section II above.115  The question was whether Devlin’s oscillation between 
a public harm view and a legal moralist view of legal punishment and 
prohibition is just a product of philosophical clumsiness, so to speak,
or whether it has a deeper source.  The correct answer may be that Devlin’s
“ruminations of an English judge of no philosophic formation,” as John 
Finnis described his position,116 expose more crudely than sophisticated
philosophical training would allow the inner tensions of the liberal discourse
on the limits of the state’s coercive power based on the harm principle. 
The inner tensions I have in mind are the ones exposed by Steven Smith 
when he brilliantly conceived of smuggling as the key to understanding 
why the constitutional reasoning of lawyers and judges continues to work
110. Constituição da República Portuguesa [Constitution] April 25, 1976, art. 46(4). 
111. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art 2., translation at http://www.gesetze-im­
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0114 [https://perma.cc/8T95-G4P8].
112. See HART, supra note 24, at 259; see also GEORGE, supra note 34, at 69. 
113. This alludes to the nightmarish combination of methodological individualism 
and the precedence of collective goals over individual differences as described by Charles
Taylor.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 181 (1995). 
114. See MICHAEL HALBERSTAM, TOTALITARIANISM AND THE MODERN CONCEPTION
OF POLITICS 113–18 (1999). 
115. See supra Section II. 
116. FINNIS, supra note 26, at 270. 
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relatively well despite the fact that it is spectacularly unpersuasive, at least
to many of us.117  Smith’s point is that our public discourse is based on the
exclusion of our deepest normative commitments as a condition for forming 
public deliberations. Since we cannot avoid such commitments, we are 
condemned to live in a state of permanent dissatisfaction with how public
deliberation functions.
We can see this scheme at work in Devlin’s oscillation between the 
moderate and extreme theses on the legal enforcement of morals.  In general, 
Devlin’s argument is based on the definition of conventional morality in 
terms of harm to society.118  Yet it is precisely the fact that he focuses on 
harm to society as a whole, and not to its individual members, that adds 
to his difficulties in defining the mechanism of public harm, as we saw 
above.119 This mechanism has an empirical basis that Devlin the judge was
unable to deliver or simply to evade, as I have attempted to do in Section IV
above.120  Amidst such difficulties, Devlin could not help revealing his
deepest conviction on the issue of legal morality: “without the help of Christian
teaching the law will fail.”121  In other words, beyond a certain point, Devlin
was unable to keep on smuggling his normative convictions into the language
of public harm and directly addressed the real truth of the matter as he saw 
it.  He was just not able, or willing, to keep on playing the smuggling game. 
Steven Smith sees smuggling as an unavoidable condition of our
contemporary public discourse.122  As he sees it, this does not necessarily 
make it worse “than public discourse was two centuries or ten centuries
or two millennia ago”; in fact, “[i]n some respects modern public discourse 
may deserve higher marks than public discourse of many past times did[.]”123 
In his view, smuggling is, however, a “discursive shortcoming” that is 
especially characteristic of our times.124  This failing is because smuggling 
implies that an argument is based on undisclosed premises.125  These premises
are not revealed because the conventions that govern the kind of argument
 
 117.  S , supra note 36, at 26. 
118.  See gen
MITH
erally DEVLIN, supra note 9. 
119.  See supra Section III. 
120.  See supra Section IV. 
121.  D , supra note 9, at 25. 
122.  SMITH
EVLIN
, supra note 36, at 37. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. at 38. 
125. Id. at 35. 
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into which they are smuggled seek to exclude them, as is the case when
we say that public deliberation is not to be based on religious considerations.126 
Conversely, smuggling could perhaps be viewed in the manner La 
Rochefoucauld saw as hypocrisy: as a tribute that vice pays to virtue,127 
but this does not seem accurate unless we are willing to envision our
deepest convictions as “vice” and public secular discourse as “virtue.”
Steven Smith’s hypothesis is precisely that sometimes, or perhaps most of
the time, we use public discourse as a convenient vehicle to smuggle in 
our pre-existing values and commitments, as an instrument that allows us
to deliver an air of neutrality and objectivity to the fact that the principles 
we arrive at in the public use of reason were the ones we already held from 
the start.128  In this light, public discourse must be the smuggling vice and
our deepest convictions are surely the virtue. We can also look at things
differently and see public reason not as an expression of some sort of
freestanding view of political values but as a necessary outgrowth of our
commitments in a setting of inevitable pluralism of values and commitments. 
Adapting Kant’s famous phrase, we could perhaps say that public reason 
without our deepest commitments is empty, but these are blind without some
sort of public use of reason.129  This would call for a “togetherness principle”
regarding the public use of reason and the adoption of any sort of religious
or philosophical values and convictions, in the sense of the necessary
complementarity and interdependence of both.  Smuggling may well be 
understood as a way of making proselytism look like an offering of secular 
and objective reasons, but that may not necessarily be bad for the quality 
or even the continuation of our public life, at least if we keep playing the 
smuggling game. 
126. Id. at 36. 
127. Cf. FRANÇOIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 97 (Leonard Tancock trans.,
Penguin Books 1959) (1678). 
128. See SMITH, supra note 36, at 26–27. 
129. See  IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 93 (Norman Kemp Smith
trans., Palgrave Macmillan rev. 2d ed. 2003) (1929) (“[T]houghts without content are empty,
intuitions without concepts are blind.”).
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